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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM HARVEY

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CASTRO
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OPERATION MONGOOSE
BISSELL, RICHARD
ASSASSINATION
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
THE PRESIDENT
QJWIN
MAFIA
SILVER, ARNOLD

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counterespionage for a brief period against the Japanese and the Italians and the Russians in '41. Then during most of the War, against the Germans, and then beginning in early '45 until the middle of '47 against the Soviet service again.

Mr. Schwarz. And then in 1947, did you join the CIA as head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch?

Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Is that also counterespionage?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it was.

Mr. Schwarz. And then between 1947 and 1952, you worked on Soviet counterespionage and certain special operations in the Department for Plans, is that right?

Mr. Harvey. Well, that is correct. It was a particular command and staff responsibility on communications intelligence and for a period of, I would think probably eight to ten months, I headed a planning staff, along with that.

Mr. Schwarz. In 1952, did you go to Berlin as Chief of Station for the CIA?

Mr. Harvey. I did.

Mr. Schwarz. And were you there until 1959?

Mr. Harvey. Until the end of 1959.

Mr. Schwarz. I understand, Mr. Harvey, that you had some rather substantial accomplishments there, such as the Berlin Tunnel.

Could you just very succinctly describe the Berlin Tunnel

operation and then move on?

Mr. Harvey. Well, very briefly, that is an operation that [redacted] and I conceived some time before I went to Berlin.

Senator Tower. You and who?

Mr. Harvey. Frank Rollett, who for many years was one of the, if not the most, knowledgeable senior officer in the [redacted]

And one of the reasons I went [redacted] was to attempt to mount this operation.

In substance, what it amounted to was setting up a fairly complex cover within a cover installation [redacted]

Senator Tower. Were not what?

Mr. Harvey. Were not readable.

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Schwarz. I have been told, Mr. Harvey -- is this not correct -- that you not only conceived the program but [redacted]

Mr. Harvey. I did.

Mr. Schwarz. In 1959, did you become Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff Division D?

Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Now is Division D a division of the CIA which is responsible for [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. That is also correct.

Mr. Schwarz. But part --

Mr. Harvey. But I would like to clarify it, if I may, Mr. Schwarz. It was the division of the clandestine services, which was the focal point and was responsible for primarily two things: [redacted].

We had nothing to do beyond that with the general sort of research and analysis use which was handled in [redacted] what I believe was the DDI, Deputy Director Intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. Did Staff D include within its responsibilities [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, in two ways: complete control and

coordination of any such efforts, approval and assessment of the security risk, and also in the direct procurement through operational means abroad, but not in this country.

Mr. Schwarz. And by operational, you mean [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. [redacted] that type of thing. [redacted] would be covered as well.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, did a man call [redacted] work for you in Staff D?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, he did.

Mr. Schwarz. At some point, did [redacted] recount to you a conversation concerning Patrice Lumumba?

Mr. Harvey. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you state what he said to you?

Mr. Harvey. Briefly, [redacted] came to me and said that he had been approached by Richard Bissell, who was then Deputy Director for Plans, to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to undertake this assignment.

Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr Bissell subsequently have a conversation with you in which he also recounted the fact that he had requested [redacted] to undertake such an operation?

of assassination is obviously a two-pronged subject, ours and theirs. We spent countless hours over the years trying to determine the parameters of how far the Soviet service was willing to go. This was partly a question of assessment, this was partly a question, to put it just as bluntly, of self-protection.

I will try to summarize what I think are fair conclusions. In the field of political assassination, although I cannot document this by evidence, I have no question but what the Soviet service has, does, and will continue to use the tool of assassination to accomplish political gains inside and outside of the USSR. In the intelligence field, I think you have to make a distinction, the distinction roughly -- and I'm over-simplifying this slightly -- but a distinction into perhaps three classes.

One, their own ethnics or nationals. Secondly, indigenous agents of third countries. And thirdly, the recognized official staff officers of other intelligence services.

During the seven years that I spent [redacted], which was the longest continuous period that I was exposed in depth to Soviet Executive Action, we lost a great many Russians, a great many Germans, a certain number of Czechs, Poles and other nationalities.

Mr. Schwarz. When you say you lost Russians, you mean Russians who were working with the United States?

Mr. Schwarz. Anyway, it exists, as a combination.

Mr. Harvey. In other words, if you want to put it in just these blunt terms, it would have been a lot easier for the KGB to assassinate me [redacted] than it would have been for me to assassinate my opposite number [redacted], in the Soviet Embassy [redacted]

Mr. Schwarz. In describing the Soviets, you distinguish between political assassination, direct agents of the United States, and finally the emigres and foreign nationals.

Mr. Harvey. And also -- well, not foreign nationals, but emigres and Soviet nationals.

Mr. Schwarz. That's what I meant. Soviet nationals.

Mr. Harvey. The most merciless, the field where they are the most merciless are their own defected agents, of course.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, to your knowledge, has the United States ever assassinated a defected agent or a third country?

Mr. Harvey. You mean an American agent who has defected or doubled?

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Harvey. To my personal knowledge, no.

Mr. Schwarz. What about persons who are third country enemies of the United States?

Mr. Harvey. No.

Mr. Schwarz. You don't know any instance of the United States assassinating any person who is in the non-political

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Eyes Only basis, and the first part of this was the necessary documentation for the authority which was later signed off on by Dick Helms as Deputy Director.

Beginning on my page 4, your middle of page 3 --

Mr. Schwarz. Well, just a moment. Page 1 is a cover story, not the real story, the objectives --

Mr. Harvey. It is both.

Mr. Schwarz. But it does not recite as an objective, assassination or assassination capability.

Mr. Harvey. No, it does not.

Mr. Schwarz. Instead, it cites the obtaining of code and cypher materials.

Mr. Harvey. Which, I would like to point out, was a perfectly legitimate objective and was not in a sense, a cover story except that if this project had gone so far as to the actual recruitment of any agent for assassination or the targetting of any target or the mounting of any operation, it would have been under this as a cover. But, those assets that were spotted by QJWINN, for instance, under ZRRIFLE were also honestly considered for possible clandestine procurement of communications intelligence outside the U.S.

So it's -- maybe I'm not making this clear, it's a cover in a sense, but it's not a phony cover, in other words.

Mr. Schwarz. Dual purpose.

Mr. Harvey. It was a dual purpose.

Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned QJWINN. Was QJWIN an agent who you did hold in reserve for possible use in connection with the Executive Action program?

Mr. Harvey. No, QJWIN is an agent that I considered for possible use and used for a limited period through [redacted] for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use, none of whom were ever advised of the use, none of whom, as far as I personally know, were ever used.

Mr. Schwarz. But the multi-purpose use included as one purpose the possible use in assassination?

Mr. Harvey. Only in the sense that had we ever been saddled with a flat, if you will, command performance on assassination. I might have considered the people spotted by WIN as possibilities.

But, you see, before anybody that is ever spotted is approached for any operation and particularly -- and please, I don't mean to sound pedantic on this, ~~I don't mean to~~ -- is actually approached, there ~~is a~~ should be long period of assessment, crosschecks, so on and so forth. This particular spotting mechanism never actually went that far, as far as I know.

I only know of one use made by QJWIN until we terminated him some months later, I don't remember the exact date. It was before I went to Rome. I know it was in connection with an operation in the Congo that was not an assassination operation.

 Follow

and had, as far as I know, personally, at least, nothing to do with assassination.

I have checked pages 1 and 2 and 3 and my page 4.

Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 4 through 7, in your judgment, pages that were written by [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. As a guess, I'd say they appear to be in the same writing as these first three pages.

Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 8 and 9 pages that are written by you?

Mr. Harvey. Well, just a moment, let me get to those.

I would also like to point out that from page 4 that -- that is page 4, as long as it continues in the same handwriting was not a part of this so-called Project Outline, these I would guess were probably [redacted]'s notes and probably based, at least to an extent, on discussions he had with me, and certain sort of problems and questions and principles that I tossed out to be considered and cares to be exercised.

Mr. Schwarz. Then pages 8 and 9 are in your handwriting, is that right?

Mr. Harvey. Pages 8 and 9 are in my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. And at the bottom of page 8, does that indicate that you had a conversation with [redacted] on January 26th?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

Mr. Schwarz. And is it your judgment that that is January

26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it is.

Mr. Schwarz. And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that you have recounted?

Mr. Harvey. I think probably that might be -- well, when I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion at the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver.

Now, these two pieces of paper, well, I say two pieces of paper, what they are from -- they are in my handwriting. It's from a yellow pad, probably the duplicate of this that I used to keep on my desk and just make rough notes of conversations that I had, telephone and otherwise, with various people.

Once a week I would go through them and either destroy them, classified trash, dictate from them, or occasionally save them. There is no relationship between the material that appears after the line two-thirds of the way down the page, just

before the 26/1-AS, , and the material which appears above it which is tabbed SID G, tab 21.

Mr. Schwarz. That would be Sid Gottlieb?

Mr. Harvey. Sid Gottlieb.

Mr. Schwarz. Doesn't the conversation with Sid Gottlieb on the 25th of January indicate you had discussion which included the word bankruptcy and you felt assassination was --

Mr. Harvey. There was a general philosophic discussion of assassination and assassination techniques. There was also a discussion on a number of other things that were of particular and specific interest to the communications intelligence field and the clandestine service's responsibilities aspects, if you will, and as best I can recall this conversation, this was a sort of an exchange of ideas and briefing session, probably held at the request of Sid Gottlieb in my office shortly after he either took over a new job in TSD or took over as actual Chief of TSD, which was the Technical Services Division of the clandestine services.

Mr. Schwarz. Now the reference in the middle of that conversation with Mr. Gottlieb to "Last resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness." That's referring to assassination?

Mr. Harvey. That's obviously referring to assassination. That's probably what I told Sid Gottlieb my opinion on the use and propriety of assassination as a technique was.

of operational philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb, that the question then came in pure theory as to -- as in such cases as, now assumptions, the example of 3 wrong, I am not really sure. But the closest that I can come is that the assumptions -- it might be desirable in a purely theoretical discussion and in my opinion we were wrong. Whether I said that to Gottlieb in the words that are here, I just don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. Who were the two besides Mr. Trujillo that make up the examples of 3?

Mr. Harvey. I presume -- I have no idea, but I presume that the logical candidates at that point would have been Lumumba and Castro. By logical candidates, I mean not that we were considering them in this discussion as logical targets for assassination, but that these were sort of the three people that would come to mind; if you are going to go into this, these are three to be considered.

tape 2b

But you will notice, if I may, Mr. Schwarz, "Framework of Sid's job. ELINT R&D - Memo." Ludford is the name of ~~the~~ staff officer who worked for me in Division D at that time.

This "translating machine" was an experimental device, done under -- hoped for development by GE that I was most interested in, because of the serious translation problem that we had and particularly in communications intelligence.

So you see this was not a discussion strictly within the framework of either assassination as a specific, or assassination

as a general problem.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, the material commencing on handwritten page 4 and commencing in the middle of page 3 of the Senator's notes, reflects in your judgment the conversation that you had with [redacted] and it is his notes about that conversation, is that right?

Mr. Harvey. That is my best guess.

It may also, however, include his own thinking and so forth. I doubt if it includes -- it certainly would not include any specific discussions, I don't think, with other officers, because [redacted] was under specific instructions not to discuss this as such with anybody else, at least without clearing it with me first.

Mr. Schwarz. And he starts, for example, by talking about "Legal, ethical, morale, operational problems" and so forth, and that reflects the conversation you had with [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

Mr. Schwarz. Down toward the end of entry 3b -- and 3 has the heading "Maximum security" -- do you see that on page 4?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, I see it.

Mr. Schwarz. There is a sentence which reads as follows -- two sentences, which I should read into the record, three sentences.

"Within Kubark" -- now, is that the CIA?

crossed in this document.

Mr. Schwarz. One way or the other?

Mr. Harvey. That's right. One way or the other.

Mr. Schwarz. Your note has a report to the DCI, the January 26th reference, which reads in the first line AS. That is Arnold Silver, I take it?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, I'm sure that's Arnold Silver.

Mr. Schwarz. Then it appears to say f-a-n-f-o-r-n DCI matter. What does that mean?

Mr. Harvey. I am not sure. The closest I could come to that is a fairly illogical Fanfani, and Fanfani was never even dreamed of, as far as I know, in any such context. Fanforn -- Burton Wides raised that with me, and I just had to throw up my hands. I just don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. And you don't know what the reference to DCI in the notes means?

Mr. Harvey. No, I am sorry, I do not, at this point, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

Mr. Harvey. Are you asking me to try to interpret the portion of this that is in my handwriting, or are you satisified at this point?

Mr. Schwarz. Well, the other items, it seems to me, are either not important or are understandable. Maybe some of the members have questions.

Scd G — 25/1 — Exec Actions

— "The Magic button" 8

Narcotics Büro

"for a living" — RIS 201 Cover

Caution — Bankruptcy — no Stars

eyes — Jim A. / Contradistinct

not a TSD problem / from U-2

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness. —

— El Benefactor → assumptions —

Examples 3 "wrong"

Framework of [redacted] job: [redacted]

[redacted] Memo.

[redacted]

[redacted] Fear

Anathesia —

26/1 — [redacted] Fanform-DCI- Matter

no file Review — [redacted]

1. Select proper officer to run —
2. [redacted] Mary of 2
3. Security Rules B-WHM-AS-3
4. Guide lines [redacted] — Review.

Last Resort — Brakes — Substitute —

9

6. No [redacted]
7. no projects or papers except for cover.
8. Principal Agent – I ([redacted]) ? – [redacted] Project Chief LCH – ticket 1500 – from NB. Mask spot agm. staff [redacted] project – dec Blake
9. Disposal –
10. Targets who & where – Must know before we can spot –

—

11. Case officering
12. [redacted]
13. [redacted]

Fd I list – Remember